EFFECT OF THE 1985 FARM BILL PROVISIONS ON FARMERS' SOIL CONSERVATION DECISIONS by Gillespie, Jeffrey M. et al.
SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS  DECEMBER 1990
EFFECT OF THE  1985 FARM  BILL PROVISIONS  ON
FARMERS' SOIL CONSERVATION  DECISIONS
Jeffrey M. Gillespie, L. Upton Hatch, and Patricia A. Duffy
Abstract  participants  in the  1985 Farm  Bill differ from  soil
Conservation  initiatives  in  the  1985  Farm  Bill  losses  for  non-participants,  whether  the  acreage
affected farmers' decisions regarding soil conserva-  reduction requirements of the commodity programs
tion. A farmer  survey  was conducted and a multi-  render these programs unattractive, and what effect
period  mixed-integer  programming  model  was  decreasing  target prices  will have  on future  com-
developed to determine  an optimal  farm plan  with  modity  program  participation  and  resulting  crop
choices of crop-tillage combinations and land retire-  mix.
ment.  Results  indicate  that  farmers'  incentives  to  To accomplish the objectives of the study, a farmer
reduce  soil  loss  in  the  Sand  Mountain  region  in  survey was conducted in the Sand Mountain region
Alabama are not substantially affected by provisions  of Alabama to identify crops grown, tillage practices
of the 1985 Farm Bill. The bid price for the Conser-  used, and associated costs. Survey results were used
vation Reserve Program will have to be considerably  to  develop  a multi-period  mixed-integer  program-
higher than  1988  levels to provide an incentive  to  ming model to determine an optimal farm plan for a
remove land from production.  representative row crop farm.
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reserve program, agricultural  Agricultural  policies  are  believed  to  have  had
commodity programs  mixed  effects  on  soil  erosion.  Programs  that are
thought  to  have  encouraged  soil  erosion  include
INTRODUCTION  those  that  have  encouraged  increased  acreage  of
The 1985 Farm Bill contains new provisions that  erosive crops, either by decreasing risk or increasing
are  causing  farmers  to  re-evaluate  previous  net returns. These programs include dairy subsidies,
decisions  regarding  soil  conservation.  While  pre-  export promotions, price supports, target prices, and
vious farm  bills have  included  little incentive  for  federal  crop  insurance  (Osteen).  However,  some
farmers  to conserve soil, provisions of the present  program  provisions  may  reduce  erosion.  These
Farm  Bill that encourage soil conservation  include  provisions  include  the  conservation  compliance
conservation compliance, the Conservation Reserve  provisions,  acreage  reduction  programs,  and  the
Program  (CRP),  the 50/92  Program,  the  Acreage  Conservation Reserve Program  (CRP).1
Reduction  Program,  and  the  Optional  Paid  Land  Some economic studies have used optimal control
Diversion  Program. Faced with these program  op-  theory to analyze soil erosion  through time. Pope et
tions, farmers must decide among alternative com-  al. (1983a)  showed that Iowa  farmers who treated
modity programs, crop enterprises, and conservation  all future generations equally would conserve soil to
practices. Government policy makers must, in turn,  the tolerance  level,  while  those who were uncon-
be informed  of the potential  effectiveness  of their  cerned about future generations would not conserve
programs.  soil.
The objective of this study is to discover how the  Another application  of optimal control theory in-
1985 Farm Bill provisions affect crop mix and con-  volved  a study  in  the Palouse  Wheat-Pea  area  of
servation decisions. In particular, this study seeks to  Washington,  in which it was determined that inten-
answer pertinent questions concerning the relation-  sive  wheat  production  through  time  could  be
ship between  agricultural policy  and soil conserva-  economically justified as long as good cultural prac-
tion, such as how soil losses for commodity program  tices (those that prevent the soil from eroding above
1 The net effects of strict cross-compliance provisions are less  certain. Although cross-compliance might result in reduced total
erosion on a particular farm, the requirement may reduce producer participation  in the farm programs  and thus have an adverse affect.
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179the  tolerance  level)  were  used  (Burt).  In  a  sub-  ticipation  was  the  preferred  strategy  for all  risk-
sequent study, McConnell also concluded that good  preference groups under both farm bills. According
cultural practices should be used in the long run for  to Helms  et al., farmers would  be more  likely to
the benefit of future generations.  In these studies,  adopt a no-tillage practice under the  1981 program
beginning soil depth was assumed to be sufficiently  than under the  1985 bill.
deep so that soil erosion had no large short-run effect
on  yields  and  returns.  In  Alabama,  however,  the
topsoil is already  so badly eroded  that soil produc-  DATA
tivity can be greatly affected by soil erosion even in  Farmers of the Sand Mountain region of Alabama
the short run (Hajek and McDaniel).  were  surveyed  to determine  input usage  and crop
Several studies have addressed soil loss restriction  yields under different tillage practices. The region,
policies  similar  to  the  conservation  compliance  located in Northeast  Alabama,  is characterized  by
provision. Pope et al. (1983b)  found that, for Iowa  rolling hills with cropland, pastureland,  and wood-
farms with moderately or highly erodible soils, net  land. Alabama counties with all or part of their area
returns decreased under soil loss restrictions because  in the survey region include Jackson, DeKalb, Mar-
conservation  practices  resulted  in  lower  income,  shall, Blount, and Cullman.
Osteen  and  Seitz  also  found  decreases  in returns  Farmers  were  asked  to provide  information  for
under soil loss restrictions on Illinois soils.  1984  through  1986.  Input usage data for fertilizer,
In an analysis of the impacts of income support and  machinery,  chemicals,  and labor were obtained, as
soil conservation  policies across the United States,  well  as data  on  yields and  crop  acreages.  Tillage
Boggess and Heady concluded that land retirement  practices were characterized as either conventional,
programs enrolling a large percentage of qualifying  reduced, or no-tillage.2 For each crop-tillage prac-
land were more  effective at decreasing  soil losses  tice, the surveys were used to calculate average input
than were general soil loss restrictions. Other studies  use, and then the survey results were used to modify
concerning  soil  loss  restrictions  analyzed  the  budgets of the Alabama Cooperative Extension Ser-
relationship of both rising energy prices and soil loss  vice  (ACES)  to  reflect  different  tillage  practices.
restrictions  to soil loss (Zinser et al.) and the effect  Yields used in the budgets  were the average yields
on soil loss of externally  imposed soil loss restric-  across all three years for each crop-tillage combina-
tions, farmers' risk preferences and their willingness  tion.  In  Table  1, information  from  the  survey  is
to tolerate soil loss (Kramer et al.). In Kramer et al.,  summarized. 3
gross returns were equal among tillage practices, but  In  the  region,  crops  grown  using  conservation
conservation tillage was considered to be more risky  practices  were  generally  as  profitable  as  crops
than  conventional  tillage.  Some erosion  control  grown using conventional practices. While chemical
programs,  such  as  soil  loss  restrictions  and  and seed costs were higher for crops grown using
regulatory  erosion  constraints,  caused  significant  conservation practices, machinery costs were higher
reductions in income.  for  conventionally  tilled  crops.  These  results are
Other  economic  research  analyzing  soil erosion  consistent with those of previous studies, in which it
has focused on the effects of technological progress  was also  found  that use of no-tillage  systems  (as
on  soil erosion  and the  problems  associated  with  opposed to conventional  tillage  systems) had little
variable  soil losses.  In a  recent  study, Taylor  and  or no effect on net returns where good soil-conserv-
Young  considered  the effect of the interaction  be-  ing  cultural  practices  were  used  or  where  equal
tween  technological  progress  and  soil  erosion  on  yields resulted  (Hunter  and Keller;  Klemme).  Al-
future crop yields. Results showed that, where exist-  though our study and others have found that yields
ing  topsoils  were  shallow  or  a farmer's  planning  are  as  good or  better  for  conservation  tillage,
horizon  was relatively  long, policies  were  not re-  Belknap  and Saupe have pointed out several  addi-
quired to achieve erosion control goals.  tional factors that affect farmers'use of conservation
Helms  et  al. used  simulation  modeling  and  tillage  in  Wisconsin.  Farmers  using  conservation
stochastic dominance  to analyze alternative tillage  tillage tend to operate larger farms, own rather than
systems under both the 1981  and the 1985 far bills.  rent land, be less risk averse, be involved in farmer
Conservation tillage with government program par-  organizations  and be longer-term planners.
2  Conventional  tillage involves the use of a chisel plow, a disc harrow, a "do-all," and a conventional cultivator. Reduced tillage
involves  the use of a chisel plow and a disc harrow. No-tillage involves  the use of a no-till planter.
3 Detailed information  on the farmer survey and the resulting crop budgets can be found in Gillespie et al.
180Table 1. Selected  Data Used in Economic Programming  Model for Agricultural Tillage Practices in the
Sand Mountain Region of Alabama,  1987
Com  Corn  Corn  Com  Com  Corn  Soyb  Soyb  Soyb  Soyb  WSDCWSDCWSDCWSDC  Cons
Conv  Conv  Red  Red  No-t  No-t  Conv  Conv  Red  Red  Red  Red  No-t  No-t  Res
Itema  Str  Cont  Str  Cont  Str  Cont  Str  Cont  Str  Cont  Str  Cont  Str  Cont  Prog
Market Returns, $/a
90.92  89.49  95.50  94.38  94.73  92.95  69.68  67.25  67.99  66.88  89.06  87.60  86.85  85.54
Program  Returns, $/ab
1987  108.08  106.93  110.66  109.76  110.60  109.18  - - - 102.38  101.32  100.78  99.83  50.19
1991  78.00  76.86  81.50  80.60  80.97  79.55  - - 88.93  87.87  87.33  86.38  50.19
Soil Loss,  ton/a
7.9  4.0  6.5  3.3  4.6  2.3  10.6  5.3  7.7  3.9  9.3  4.6  6.6  3.3  0
Labor (hrs/acre)
Labor  1 c 0.26  0.29
Labor 2  0.84  0.92  0.84  0.92  0.35  0.39
Labor 3  0.82  0.9  0.5  0.55  0.5  0.55  2.18  2.4  1.31  1.44  0.9  0.99  0.64  0.7  0
Labor 4  0.45  0.5  0.45  0.5  0.45  0.5  0.45  0.5  0.45  0.5  0.62  0.68  0.62  0.68  0
Survey Freq. (pct)
Farmers  29  29  23  23  40  40  43  43  14  14  20  20  20  20  21
Responses  15  15  12  12  21  21  23  23  7  7  11  11  11  11  n.a.
aWhere Conv = conventional tillage,  Red = reduced tillage, No-t = no tillage, Str= straight row, and Cont = contoured.
"Market  Returns" refers to returns for crops grown outside of government programs.  "Program  Returns" refers to
returns for crops grown  under farm  program  provisions.
bProgram  net returns  are reduced  by the percentage of required set-aside.
CLabor requirements  by period. Period  1  :Feb.  11 - Mar 31.  Period 2: Apr 1 -Apr.  30 Period 3: May 1 - Jun. 30. Period
4: Sept.  1 - Nov. 30. Only minor amounts are required at other times.
~~~METHODS  ~vation  compliance  restrictions,  and  limited  cross-
The  survey  data  were  used  to  develop a  multi-  compliance. Under ARP, apercentage of commodity
period  mixed integer programming  model  capable  program  land must be  idled or set  aside.  Limited
of analyzing  the effects  of selected  farm program  cross-compliance requires that, if one or more com-
provisions  on  soil conservation  decisions.  The  5-  modities  are grown in the program, the acreage  of
year model  was based on a multiperiod  mixed in-  any other crop covered by the Farm  Bill must not
teger programming  model  developed  by  Mims  et  exceed its base acreage, even if it is not enrolled in
al.4 In this model, base acreage was calculated as a  the program.
moving  average,  and 0-1  mixed  integer  program-  The targetprice projections used in the model were
ming was used to ensure either participation or non-  those included in the 1985 Farm Bill, which decrease
participation in commodity programs.  over  the  life  of the  Farm  Bill  (see  Stucker  and
For our study, this model was expanded to include  Collins).  The  first  year of  the  model  planning
detailed  representation  of  the  conservation  horizon was assumed  to be  1987, a year when the
provisions  of  the  1985  Farm  Bill.  Government  1985 Farm Bill provisions were fully implemented.
programs included in the model are: the basic com-  Commodity prices  in years  one through five were
modity programs,  the 50/92 Program, the Optional  held  constant  at  average  prices  from  years  1984
Paid Land Diversion Program (OPLD), and the CRP.  through  1986. Crop prices per bushel were: wheat,
The  basic commodity  programs  all  involve target  $2.89; corn, $2.56; and soybeans, $5.56. 5 Program
prices, Acreage Reduction Programs (ARP), conser-  net returns, therefore, decrease  relative to non-pro-
4 Although CRP is a ten-year program, a five-year planning horizon was used, rather than a longer one, because of considerable
uncertainty about the long-run direction of farm programs. Returns to CRP beyond the five-year horizon  are discounted and included
in the model.
5 Barring any dramatic changes in the market structure,  the 1984-1986 average prices should serve as reasonably good proxies
for farmers' expected market prices. In reality, prices  will vary over the time horizon. It is recognized that new information,
particularly price information, will affect the planning decisions in years two through five. Unfortunately, future prices are
impossible to predict with  accuracy. Sensitivity analysis was performed on prices and major conclusions  of this study were not
changed.
181gram  returns  over  the five-year  period  (Table  1).  that would result from instituting the following com-
Program  net returns for corn and wheat are higher  bination of erosion  control  practices:  crop residue
than  non-program net returns  in  the earlier years.  use, contour farming,  and a water disposal system
However,  as  target  prices  decrease,  non-program  defined  as  whatever  practices  are  necessary  to
crops have relatively higher net returns because they  remove  concentrated  water  safely-primarily
require no acreage reduction.  grassed waterways  and/or terracing.  The cropping
An  option  of the  grain  programs  is  the  50/92  system may include continuous row crops with con-
Program, which allows the farmer to plant between  ventional  tillage,  as  long  as  the  overall  soil-loss
50  and 92 percent  of permitted  base  acreage  and  objective is met.
receive deficiency  payments  on 92 percent of per-  For a representative  row crop farm in the survey
mitted acreage. The Optional Paid Land Diversion,  region, the Alternative Conservation  System would
however,  is  available only  for corn. This program  result in average soil losses of approximately  5 tons
gives the farmer the option to divert a percentage of  per acre. 6 In our model, the soil loss restriction was
corn  base, in addition to  the required set-aside,  to  initially set to this level, and then sensitivity analysis
conservation uses. A set price per bushel is received,  was performed.
and total payment  is based  on proven  yields,  the  According to the survey results, commonly grown
calculation of which has varied  considerably  over  crops include corn using conventional,  reduced,  or
the last several years. In this study, proven yields are  no-tillage;  soybeans using conventional or reduced
assumed equal to actual yields.  tillage; and wheat-soybeans  double cropped using
CRP participation  requires  that the  farmer take  reduced or no-tillage.  All crop-tillage practices can
cropland out of production  for ten years and plant  be  implemented  with  either  contoured  or  straight
vegetative cover which can consist of trees or grass.  rows. All of these possibilities were included as crop
For each acre of CRP land entered, a percentage of  activities  in the linear programming  model. Labor
an acre of base is reduced. This percentage is calcu-  requirements  were  calculated  from  Alabama
lated from total base acres divided by total cropland  Cooperative  Extension  Service  machinery  coeffi-
acres. The CRP net returns  were  set at $50.19  per  cients.
acre based on the winter, 1987 average bid price of  A cost  of  soil  loss  of  10.6  cents  per  ton  was
$45.00 in Alabama and a discounted annual value of  established in the model. This cost was derived from
$5.19 (McKee)  for harvested  timber after 25 years.  soil loss and productivity studies by Hajek and Mc-
Although grass cover was also an option under CRP,  Daniel, who found that when average Alabama soils
tree plantings resulted in higher returns; thus, grass  went from a slightly eroded to a moderately eroded
coverage was not incorporated into the model.  state, crop yields decreased an average of 22 percent.
The programming  model  was  constructed  for  a  The cost was calculated from returns from the least
representative  420 acre  farm  located  in  the  Sand  profitable crop, causing the estimate to be conserva-
Mountain region. Based on survey findings, the farm  tive.7
had a 190 acre corn base and 160 acre wheat base in  MO
year one. Base in subsequent years  was calculated
as a moving average of crop acreages.  Soil on  the  The objective function of the linear programming
representative  farm was assumed  to be a Hartselle  model is the maximization of discounted net returns.
fine sandy loam of class He with a four percent slope  A 5 percent annual discount rate was used. Table 2
and slope length of 125 feet, a representative soil for  provides  a  simplified  illustration  of some  of  the
this region (Hajek et al.).  model's constraints.  In this example, there are two
For the conservation requirement of the 1985 Farm  program crops (corn no-tillage and corn convention-
Bill to be met, farmers must reduce erosion to a level  al-tillage) and two non-program crops (corn no-til-
at or below that which would occur under the "Al-  lage and corn conventional-tillage).
ternative Conservation System" defined by the Soil  The integer variables INT PROG CORN and INT
Conservation Service. The Alternative Conservation  NPROG CORN represent program participation and
System for erosion control of the representative farm  non-participation,  respectively,  in  year  one.  The
requires that erosion be reduced to or below a level  FREE LIMIT rows serve  to exclude  non-program
6  Earl Norton, State Resource Conservationist  for the Alabama Soil Conservation Service, confirmed these figures for a
representative row crop farm with the specified soil type and slope. Soil loss under the Alternative Conservation System would vary
somewhat from farm to farm.
7  There is currently not enough information  concerning the effects of soil loss on this variety of soil to develop a more
sophisticated (e.g. non-linear) equation describing the relationship.
182Table 2. Illustration of Matrix Development  in Economic Programming  Model
PROG
INT  INT  ACRE  CORN  PROG  PROG  PLANT  MKT  MKT  SOIL  PLANT  SET  CORN  RED
PROG  NPROG  RES  CONV  CORN  PROG  NPROG  DEF  DEF  DEF  OPTION  CORN  BASE  CORN  CORN  LOSS  50/92  ASIDE  50/92  BASE
CORN  CORN  PROG  CONV  NO-T  CORN  CORN  PAY  PAYK  PAYX  OPLD  REG  ACRE  CONV  NT  TRANS  CRP  CORN  50/92  50/92  CONV  CRP  RHS
PROG/NPROG  1  1  <
FREE LIMIT  -10,000  1  1  <
BASE LIMIT  -190  1  1  1  <0
ACRE RED  -1  0.35  0.2  1=  0
ARP PERCT  0.65  0.8  -1  -1  0
PLANT TRAN  -1  -1  1  = 
TOT PROG  -94  -92.6  1  = 
TOT NPROG  1  -94  -92.6  -94  =  0
INCOM TRAN  149.72  142.33  -2.56  -2.56  -1  -27.60  149.72  142.33  -50.19  149.72  =  0
DEFPAYT  -. 47  1  -40.65  =  0
TRANSPAY  1  -1  -1  =  0
PAY LIMIT  1  <50,000
SOILLOSS  4.9  1.6  4.9  1.6  -1  4.9 
CORN 50  0.5  -1  <  0
CORN92  0.92  -1  >  0
LANTRAN  1  -1  1  =  0
CULTRAN  1  -1  =  0
BASE RED  -0.83  1  =0
Activities: Rows:
INT PROG CORN, 0-1  Integer for program corn PROG/NPROG,  Restriction for participation/non participation in  farm programs  INT NPROG CORN, 0-1  Integer for nonprogram com FREE  LIMIT,  Forbids nonprogram acreage if  participation is  selected  ACRE  RES PROG, Acres idled under farm program BASE LIMIT, Restricts program corn acreage to the base (year 1)  PROG CORN CONV, Conventional tillageon corn  planted under farm program ACRE RED, Calculates acreage idled due to farm programs  PROG CORN NO-T, Notillage on corn planted  under farm program ARP PERCT, Calculates amount of base acreage available for planting or 50/92  PROG CORN,  Total production of corn under  regular farm program and OPLD,, all tillage practices PLANT TRAN,  Divides program planted acreage among various cultivation options  NPROG CORN,  Total production of corn outside of farm programsor in  50/92 Program TOT PROG, Calculates total production of corn  under the regular farm program or optional paid land  DEF  PAY, Deficiency payment calculated on all eligble production diversion (OPLD)  DEF PAY K,  "Receivable" deficiency payment TOT NPROG, Calculates total production of corn outside farm program and in  50/92 program  DEF PAYX, "Excess" deficiency payment  beyond payment  limitation INCOM TRAN, Calculates  net income from corn growing  OPTION OPLD, The optional paid land diversion program alternative DEF PAY,  Calculates deficiency payment on total prduction  PROG CORN REG, The regular farm program without  optional paid land diversion. TRAN  PAY,  Divides deficiency payment into  receivable and  excess"  PLANT BASE ACRE, Planted acres under regularfarm program and farm program with optional paid land diversion PAY LIMIT,  Limites receivable deficiency payment to the payment limit  MKT CORN  CONV, Conventional tillage corn, no farm program SOIL LOSS, Calculates net soil  loss  MKT CORN NT, No-till corn,, no farm program CORN 50, Minimum planting requirement  under 50/92  SOIL LOSS TRANS, Total soil loss through all paintings CORN 92, Maximum planting under 50/92  CRP, Acreage in  the Conservation Reserve Program LANTRAN,  Transfers total 50/92 acreage to plantings and idled land  PLANT 50/92 CORN, Acres planted under the 50/92 provisions CULTRAN,  Divides planted acres under 50/92 program among various tillage options  50/92, Total acres in  the 50/92 program BASE  RED, Reduces base if  CRP is  selected  SET ASIDE 50/92, Acres idled under 5092 program
CORN 50/92 CONV, Conventionally tilled corn planted in  the 50/92 program
RED BASE CRP, Acres of base lost due to participation in  Conservation Reserve Programcorn  if the INT  NPROG CORN  non-participation  When  the  50/92  option  is  chosen,  constraints
variable  is  not  selected.  If non-participation  is  CORN 50 and CORN 92 ensure that between 50 and
selected,  the large  negative coefficient  serves as a  92 percent  of permitted  acreage  is  planted.  Con-
non-binding  constraint and other constraints in the  straint LANTRAN divides  50/92 acreage  (activity
model (land, labor, and soil loss) limit corn. If par-  50/92) into planted (activity PLANT 50/92 CORN)
ticipation is selected, row BASE LIMIT limits corn  and idled acres (activity SET ASIDE 50/92). In the
acreage  enrolled  in  the  regular  program  (PROG  actual model, the planted acreage can be cultivated
CORN REG)  and the program with  optional paid  conventionally,  or  under  reduced  or  no-tillage
diversion (OPTION OPLD) to the 190 acre base.  methods. In the illustration,  however, only one cul-
Total acreage idled (ACRE RES  PROG) through  tivation option  (CORN 50/92 CONV) is  depicted.
the regularprogram, the optional paid land diversion  The SOIL LOSS constraint adds up the net soil loss
program, and the 50/92 program is calculated in row  (total soil loss per acre less the rate of soil replenish-
ACRE  RED.  Similarly,  the  amount  of acreage  ment) per  year in tons.  In  subsequent  years,  lost
remaining for planting  (PLANT BASE  ACRE) or  productivity through soil loss is reflected in a reduc-
the 50/92 program (50/92)  is summed in row ARP  tion in total farm income valued at 10.6 cents per ton
PERCT.  Row  PLANT  TRAN  divides  planted  of soil lost. (This transfer activity is not shown in
acreage  in  the  farm  program  among  the various  Table 2.)
cultivation alternatives (no-till and conventional til-  Other constraints in the model, not shown in Table
lage shown here).  2, include a limit on total cropland of 420 acres and
An  initial  deficiency  payment  on  all  eligible  labor  constraints.  Labor  requirements  were
production  is calculated with row DEF PAYT. This  specified for four periods per year. It was assumed
deficiency  payment  is  divided  into  DEF  PAY  K,  that the farmer worked full time on the farm. Addi-
which the operator keeps, and DEF PAY X, excess  tional labor could be hired in any period for $4.50
beyond the payment limitation. The payment limita-  per hour
tion for government programs, $50,000, is enforced  RS
in  row  PAY  LIMIT.  The  TOT  PROG  and  TOT  UL
NPROG rows sum up the total yield for corn. This  The  model  was  first used to  analyze  the actual
yield is then multiplied by the price per bushel in the  1985 Farm Bill provisions (baseline analysis). Sub-
INCOME TRANS  row  to give gross  returns.  The  sequent  analyses  involved alternative  assumptions
total costs per acre are then subtracted from the gross  about (1) program availability, (2) commodity pro-
returns  in  the INCOME  TRANS  row to  give net  gram requirements, and (3)  yields. In all cases,  1987
returns. Although 50/92 corn is in the farm program,  was the first year of the 5-year  planning  horizon.
yields  are  summed  under  TOT NPROG  because  First year results are of particular interest because,
deficiency  payments  are calculated  differently for  in the "real" world,  the crop-mix  decision  in sub-
50/92 corn than for other program corn.  sequent years  would be modified by additional in-
The "CRP" activity sets the net returns for the CRP  formation as time goes on. Thus, in each subsequent
at $50.19  ($45 bid price and $5.19 annual per acre  year the initial five-year plan would be modified if
return  from  tree  harvest).  The  amount  of CRP  prices  and  program  provisions  varied  from  their
acreage  in the first year is held constant in all sub-  projected path. The full five-year results, however,
sequent years. The first year, 1987,  is the only year  are of interest for identifying the potential impacts
the farmer can opt to participate in the CRP; for the  of current farm programs on future land use.
next ten years, that land is locked into CRP.  8  The  Under the baseline scenario 9,  the optimal year one
PCT BASE REDUCT constraint specifies  the per-  crop  mix  consisted  of program  corn  no-tillage
centage  of crop  base,  83  percent,  that  must  be  straight-row,  program  wheat  double cropped  with
reduced per acre of land entered  in the CRP. Base  soybeans  reduced-tillage  contoured,  and soybeans
reduction can be taken either from corn or wheat or  conventional-tillage  straight-row.  ARP took up 82
any combination of both. In Table 2, however, only  acres  and  Optional Paid Land Diversion  (OPLD)
corn is depicted.  accounted for an additional 29 acres. No acreage was
8 Under the  1985 Farm Bill, entry into the CRP was permitted in subsequent years. However, because of the base reduction
provisions, allowing entry into the CRP in any year beyond the first would result in intractable nonlinearities in the model. Because
the objective of the model is to maximize profit and because of the nature of mathematical programming models, allowing entry into
the CRP in year one only should not present a problem. If the CRP is, indeed, a profitable  alternative, it would be selected early.
9 When limited cross-compliance was not included as a requirement in the analysis, soil loss and net returns did not change
significantly.
184placed  in CRP. The  lack  of participation  in  CRP  returns per planted acre for program  corn in  1987
reflects actual conditions in the study area. Although  were nearly 50 percent greater than for non-program
over  80  percent  of the  cropland  in  the area  was  corn, the 20 percent acreage reduction requirement
eligible  for  CRP participation,  participation  in the  caused  the  adjusted  farm-wide  net  returns  to  be
CRP was only about 5 percent.  reduced.  Thus,  soil loss  under the  "no programs"
Net returns  for  1987  were  approximately  $43.4  alternative differed little from thebaseline. Although
thousand  while  total  government  payments  were  all 420 acres of land were planted to crops in the "no
$16.7  thousand.  Total  five-year  discounted  net  programs" alternative, the less erosive corn crop was
returns were $186.3 thousand.  Labor was not hired  grown  in place of the more highly erosive  wheat-
because  the operator's labor was sufficient for the  soybeans  double  cropped  and  soybeans  single
chosen crop mix. The conservation compliance limit  cropped.
of 5 tons/acre was  not constraining because  crops  In the second alternative,  ARP was not required
grown  using conservation  practices  were selected  and OPLD was not allowed. For this alternative, the
over the less profitable conventionally tilled crops.  conservation  compliance  provision  was  also
Soil  loss  was  4.4  tons/acre.  Under  the  baseline,  removed.  Thus, the results  from  this trial  provide
program  participation  continued  in years  two  and  information  concerning  what  the "desired"  farm-
three. In years four and five, however, the decreasing  level soil loss would be if land idling programs were
target price  made farm program participation  unat-  not included in the Farm Bill. In this case, both net
tractive.  Over the five year period, real  net returns  returns  and  soil losses  increased  significantly.  In
for crops in the program decreased below net returns  year one, soil loss increased to 5.6 tons per acre (1.28
for crops not in the program (Table  1).  times the baseline),  slightly more than conservation
The baseline results  were used to create "index"  compliance would allow, and net returns increased
values  for  the results  of  the  alternative  analyses  by a factor of 1.23 relative to the baseline. The type
(Table 3), with soil loss and net returns for year one  of crops grown in year  one did not change  in this
and the five-year totals for the variables of interest.  analysis, but the number of acres of each crop grown
Baseline  results for these  variables  have  an index  changed  relative  to  the baseline.  With  no acreage
value of one and index values for the alternatives are  reduction requirement,  farm program participation
multiples of the baseline values.  was selected in all five years.  Five-year discounted
In the first alternative, no farm program participa-  net returns did not show as drastic a change from the
tion was allowed for the model farm.  10 This alter-  baseline as year one net returns,  because over  the
native resulted  in all  land being planted  either to  period, corn target prices decreased from $3.03 per
no-tillage straight-row  or reduced-tillage  contoured  bushel in 1987 to $2.63 perbushed in 1991. This low
corn. Neither soil loss nor net returns decreased by  1991  target price  was close to  the market price  of
a  great  margin  relative  to  the baseline.  Soil  loss  $2.56. A conclusion to be drawn from this analysis
decreased  to 96 percent of the baseline value while  is that, if ARP were discontinued,  soil loss would
net returns  decreased to 92 percent of the baseline  increase 28 percent on typical Sand Mountain region
value  for  1978.  Total  five-year  discounted  net  farms. The ARP, therefore, appears to be important
returns decreased slightly to an index factor of 0.96.  in  reducing  soil  erosion  for  farm  program  par-
In the  last two years of the "no programs"  alterna-  ticipants.
tive, crop mix was identical to the baseline, that is,  In  a  third  alternative,  target  prices  were  not
farm program participation was not selected in years  decreased over time but were kept at 1987 levels. In
four and five.  Thus,  for the representative  farm  in  this case, program participation  was not chosen in
this study, when no macroeconomic effects are con-  year one so that the farm could increase the corn base
sidered,  participation  in the  current farm  program  for future years, making 1987 results identical to the
with  its conservation  compliance  requirement  has  "no programs"  1987 results. Total five-year results
little effect  on net  income  or  soil  loss  relative  to  were  of more  interest  in  this particular  analysis,
non-participation.  since base was increased in years two through five.
The small change in net returns and soil loss in the  Five-year  discounted  net returns  increased  by  an
"no programs" alternative resulted because a trade-  index  factor  of 1.06  because  the  more  favorable
off exists between land idled through farm programs  commodity programs provided higher income. Total
and less erosive crops without programs. While net  five-year soil loss decreased relative to the baseline
10 Caution should be exercised in interpreting  these results. Farm programs  are assumed to be generally available, but this farm
has opted not to participate. A national elimination of farm programs would constitute a major structural shift in the markets, which
would have profound effects on price expectations.
185Table 3. Soil Losses, Net Returns, and Crop Mixes for Analysesa
1987  Five Year Totals
Discounted Net
Scenario  Soil Loss  Net Returns  Soil Loss  Returns  Crop  Mix 1987b
Index value relative to baseline
Baseline  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  Corn  and Wheat Set-Asides, Op-





(1)  No Programs  0.96  0.92  0.96  0.96  No-Till Straight-Row and
Reduced Contoured  Corn.
(2)  No Set-Aside or  1.28  1.23  1.13  1.19  No-Till Straight-Row Corn,
Optional Paid  Reduced  Contoured Wheat-
Land  Diversion  Soybeans Double Cropped,  and
Conventional Straight-Row
Soybeans.
(3)  No Decreasing  0.96  0.92  0.95  1.06  No-Till Straight-Row and
Target Pricesc Reduced Contoured  Corn.
(4)  Conservsation  0.68  0.99  0.74  1.00  Corn and Wheat Set-Asides, Op-
Compliance  tional Paid Land  Diversion, No-Till
Requirement  Straight-Row and Reduced Con-
Decreased to  toured Corn,  Reduced Contoured
Tolerance Level  Wheat-Soybeans Double
Cropped.
(5)  Yields Decreased  0.34  0.58  0.43  0.58  Corn  Set-Aside and Optional  Paid
Twenty Percent  Land  Diversion, Conservation
Reserve Program,  and Reduced
Contoured Corn.
(6)  Yields Decreased  0.96  0.99  1.17  0.98  Corn  and Wheat Set-Asides, Op-
for No-Till and  tional Paid Land Diversion,  Con-
Reduced Tillage  ventional Contoured Corn,
Conventional Straight-Row
Soybeans, and Reduced Straight-
Row Wheat-Soybeans  Double
Cropped.
aSoil losses and net returns expressed as multiples of the baseline values:  1844 tons of soil loss in  1987, $43,406 net
return in  1987, 10,990 tons of soil  loss over five years  and $186,221 net return for the five-year horizon.
bCorn and/or Wheat Set-Aside refers to acreage enrolled in  regular farm program  and Optional Paid Land Diversion
refers to corn in  the program with the additional acreage idled.
CPrograms were not used in  year one because corn base was being built on all land for future program  use.
because corn acreage increased  and acreage of the  less  erosive  reduced-tillage  contoured  corn  and
more  erosive wheat-soybeans  double cropped and  reduced-tillage  contoured  soybeans.  Because  net
single cropped  soybeans  decreased. Corn set-aside  returns differed little by tillage conservation prac-
and OPLD increased each year until 30 percent of  tices,  1987 net returns were 99 percent of baseline
the possible acreage  was left uncropped. Therefore,  net  returns.  Therefore,  if the  conservation  com-
if target prices  were held constant, farmers  would  pliance  limit  was  enforced  more  tightly  at  the
have  an  incentive  to build  base  acreage.  While  tolerance  level,  conservation  practices  would
higher target prices resulted in lower soil loss in this  change  but net returns  for the representative  farm
case, this result would only occur if the farmer did  would change very little.
not convert previously uncropped land to crops.  In the fifth alternative, crop yields were decreased
In  a  fourth  alternative,  the  conservation  com-  by twenty percent to test the effect of significantly
pliance limit was decreased  to 3 tons per acre,  the  lower yields on farmers' decisions to enter the CRP.
tolerance  level. Soil losses decreased by 32 percent  The choice of a twenty percent reduction was some-
to an index factor of 0.68. Land was converted to the  what arbitrary, but nevertheless  serves to illustrate
186the effects of low yields on the decision to enter the  CONCLUSIONS
CRP. In this scenario, two hundred acres (48 percent
of total cropland) enterd twhe CRP. ais decrease in  For the representative farm in this study, the 1985
of total cropland  ) entered the CR  This  decreased  soilloss  to an index  Farm  Bill did not appear to  have a large effect on land under cultivation decreased soil loss to an index  total  erosion.  Soil loss  on  the representative  farm
factor of 0.34, or by 66 percent in  1987. CRP land  representative  farm relactor  of  0.,  or by 66 percent in  1  .CP land  was nearly the same under the no program participa-
cropped  and  single  cropped  soybeans  e  tion scenario and  the baseline. When program
cropped  and  single  cropped  soy  , ad  the  participation was not allowed, the less erosive con- remaining  land  was  placed  in  the  less  erosive  servation  tillage corn was  grown  on all  420 acres.
servation tillage  corn was grown on all 420 acres. reduced-tillage  contoured corn. Therefore,  poorer reduced-tillage  contoured  corn.  Therefore,  poorer  When programs were allowed, cropland was planted
yielding cropland will be placed into a soil conserv-  npro  swere  erond  ated in more erosive crops but the non-eroding set-aside ing  program,  reducing  soil losses by a substantial  inmore  sivecropsbutthenon-erodgsetaside
iong  program,  reducing  sol losses by  a substantial  acreage balanced out total soil erosion. Therefore, it amount.
appears that the commodity  program  in the  1985 A sixth alternative  set yields at a lower level for  Farm  nither  sigificatly  inees 
Farm  Bill  neither  significantly  increases  nor no-tillage and reduced-tillage crops, but not for con-  ier  i decreases soil erosion on a per-farm basis. ventional-tillage  crops.  Because  some  farmers  do 
find significantly  reduced yields with conservation  A trade-off also exists for net returns. While pro-
tillage (even  though the survey data indicated that,  gram participation  raises  net  income  per planted
on  average,  this  was  not  the  case),  yields  were  acre, the required set-aside acreage causes total net
decreased  eight percent for reduced  tillage and  15  income to fall to nearly the no program participation
percent for  no-tillage.  In this  analysis,  net returns  level.  Therefore,  set-aside  percentages  should  be percent for  no-tillage. Inthisanalysisnetresmall  enough  for  commodity  programs  to  be were  only slightly lower than the baseline, as con-  mall  eno  or  commodity  programs  to  be
touring  rather  than  conservation  tillage  practices  economically  attractive  but large  enough  to  keep
was  employed.  Soil  losses  increased  by  an index  commodity  programs  from  encouraging  high  soil
factor of  1.17 over the five-year period because of  erosion or providing excessive net returns.
the use of more highly erosive crops. (Soil loss was  Decreasing  target prices  could cause farmers  to
actually lower in 1987 because conventional-tillage  discontinue program  use in the near future.  While
contoured corn had a lower soil loss than no-tillage  deficiency  payments  will  increase  net returns  on
straight-row corn.)  planted acres, set-aside acreage will cause total net
Finally, sensitivity analyses were run to test under  income  for  program  crops  to  fall  below  that  of
what  conditions  farmers  would  participate  in  the  non-program  crops.
OPLD, the 50/92 program,  and the CRP. While the  Conservation  compliance  will not greatly  affect
OPLD was selected in the baseline, neither CRP nor  Sand  Mountain  farmers'  cropping  practices.  The
50/92 was  chosen.  Sensitivity  analyses  on  OPLD  conservation  compliance  standard enforced during
indicated that it would continue to be selected for the  the  period of this study did  not greatly  affect soil
representative  farm until the per bushel payment rate  conserving behavior because the conservation  prac-
dropped below $1.50. Producers with high variable  tices already  used by most farms surveyed met the
costs, however, would be willing to participate even  standard.  Crops  using  conservation  cultural  prac-
at low per bushel payment rates.  tices were more profitable than those using conven-
For  the representative  farm,  under the baseline,  tional  cultural  practices.  While  conservation
CRP would only  be selected  if returns were at or  compliance standards may cause some farmers who
above $93 per acre. These high net returns perhaps  were not previously using conservation practices to
could  be  achieved  by  leasing  hunting  rights,  al-  convert to these practices,  the profit motive would
though  it is  doubtful  that hunting rights  could be  probably have eventually led to conversion. Conser-
leased for $40 per acre (Pope and Stoll). Alternative-  vation compliance  would affect soil losses  only if
ly,  a higher  valuation  of the  opportunity  costs  of  the  standards  were  stricter,  for  example,  at  the
operators'  labor could result in CRP being selected  tolerance level of 3 tons per acre. Although tighten-
at lower levels of returns. The lack of enrollment of  ing the soil loss restrictions affected soil loss on the
land into the CRP in the region was reflected  in a  representative farm, netreturns did not suffer greatly
Soil Conservation Service report which showed only  because  alternative  low-erosion  cultivation  prac-
two to  three percent of cropland  in the region en-  tices  were  nearly  as profitable as the more highly
rolled  by  October,  1986.  Some  other  areas  of  erosive ones.
Alabama had enrollment rates of up to 25 percent by  Of the  supply  control  programs,  Optional  Paid
that date. The  50/92 program  would be profitable  Land Diversion (OPLD) is attractive while the 50/92
only if the farmer's market  receipts did  not cover  program  and  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program
variable costs.  (CRP)  are  unattractive  to  farmers  in  the region.
187OPLD is profitable due to the associated high per-  farms in the Sand Mountain region.  Clearly, to un-
bushel  returns.  Also,  soil  loss is reduced  because  derstand the effects of commodity programs in con-
more land is diverted from  program crop use to a  servation practices in the Southeast would require an
conserving use. The 50/92 program is attractive only  investigation analysis of a similar array of factors in
to farmers whose market receipts do not cover vari-  several different physical environments. The model,
able costs.  CRP is attractive only to the following  therefore, was not intended to be representative  of
farmers: (1)  those who can receive more than $93.00  all farms in the southeastern United States. Specific
in net returns per acre from CRP participation, per-  results may vary greatly based on physical environ-
haps partially through the selling of hunting rights,  ment, but the authors hope this article communicates
(2) those who put a high value on operator's labor,  the diversity of considerations faced by farmers  in
and (3) those who farm low-yielding  land.  deciding on  conservation  practices.  Policy makers
Overall, results suggest that provisions of the 1985  and  extensionists  should  benefit  from  an  under-
Farm Bill do not significantly reduce soil losses on  standing of the interaction of these considerations.
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